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ABSTRACT 
Even though security protocols are designed to make 
computer communication secure, it is widely known that 
there is potential for security breakdowns at the human- 
machine interface.  This paper reports on a diary study 
conducted in order to investigate what people identify as 
security decisions that they make while using the web. 
The study aimed to uncover how security is perceived in 
the individual’s context of use.  From this data, themes 
were drawn, with a focus on addressing security goals 
such as confidentiality and authentication.  This study is 
the first study investigating users’ web usage focusing on 
their self-documented perceptions of security and the 
security choices they made in their own environment.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The human-machine interface is acknowledged as one of 
the primary challenges in designing secure human-
computer security systems (Patrick, Long and Flinn, 
2003).  Cryptographers create security protocols which 
are considered theoretically (mathematically) 
unbreakable, and yet when used by humans in reality, the 
protocols do not provide the security level that the theory 
promised.  The combination of (potentially multiple) 
cryptographic protocols, the various systems which the 
humans use to interact with the protocols, and the human 
users themselves, may be described as a “security 
ceremony” (Ellison, 2007). 
Our analysis of security ceremonies known to be broken 
(Ellison, 2007; Murdoch et al, 2010), has revealed that 
one source of security flaws may be attributed to the 
designers of the systems and software.     
From the human perspective, with respect to web usage, 
we do not have a good understanding of how people 
make security decisions.  Our research program therefore 
aims to examine the security system in its entirety from 
both the human perspective in the context of use, the 
interaction design perspective and the perspective of 
security protocols.  
In this study we examine people’s security decisions 
made in the context of using the web. Understanding such 
decision making processes aims to improve future 
designs of interfaces so that they better protect people’s 
security. 
Specification 
The central figure in Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) 
is “the user” (Satchell and Dourish, 2009).  Specifically, 
we have investigated users’ web usage.  Whether they are 
aware of it or not, when using the web, users make many 
security related decisions.  However, little research has 
been done to understand the range of security decisions. 
The three questions investigated in this study were: 
1. What do web users perceive to be security decisions? 
2. Having recognised a security decision is required, on 
what do users base their security decisions? 
3. What was the final decision made? 
Our exploratory study used a qualitative approach to 
investigate users’ web usage in their natural environment.  
The approach we settled on was to ask our 12 participants 
to keep a log/diary of the security decisions made in their 
web usage for one week.  From this data we have distilled 
common themes about users’ security decisions 
concerning web usage. 
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
First we will discuss the related work, and then give some 
background into three topics used for the rest of the 
paper: security; trust; and extended validation certificates. 
Related Work 
Our work is focused on mainly design aspects of security 
of online programs and entities, particularly web 
browsers and websites.   As such our work may be seen 
as similar to the empirical work of Patil and Lai (2005), 
who investigated the privacy settings of MySpace users. 
Lampe, Ellison and Steinfield (2006), in their study of 
1085 Facebook users which explored users’ expectations 
of privacy, found that 90% of participants believed that 
no one from outside their university would read their 
Facebook page, and that 97% of participants believed that 
no law enforcement agency would look at their Facebook 
page.  Sasse et al (2001) argue that existing HCI 
techniques are sufficient to address security issues in the 
design of systems.  While this may be true, we will argue 
that it is necessary to understand the security 
requirements and tools available, prior to employing 
standard HCI techniques.   
Various studies concerning trust on the internet, such as 
Lee et al (2000), have been conducted using surveys.  
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Schechter et al (2007) created a study in which bank 
websites were progressively changed, to become less and 
less secure, and the researchers determined whether the 
participants entered their password each time. In a 
departure from the survey method in which researchers 
frame the questions and the context of use is generalised, 
we have chosen to use a diary study so that participants 
identify what they perceive to be security questions in 
their own contexts of use.  
Security 
In all communications with study participants, the term 
security was used, with no further delineation provided.  
The main commonly accepted goals of security, as we 
will use the term, are defined (ISO/IEC 27001): 
Confidentiality The goal of confidentiality is to ensure 
that no communication between the parties may be 
overheard by a third party. 
Authentication The goal of authentication is to ensure that 
the parties involved are who they claim to be.  There is 
one way authentication, for example where a user proves 
to an online bank that they are a specific account holder at 
the bank; and mutual authentication where the website 
also proves to the user that they are the bank. 
Integrity The goal of integrity is to ensure that the 
message that leaves one party for another party, cannot be 
manipulated in some way before being received by the 
target party. 
Non-repudiation The goal of non-repudiation is to ensure 
that parties cannot deny sending information that they 
have committed to.  A similar real world concept is a 
signature on a legal document, where the signatory should 
not be able to deny signing the document. 
Availability The goal of availability is to ensure that a 
system is available for use.  An example decision is, 
“What will happen after three failed login attempts?” 
Trust 
Literature from the past fifteen years is replete with 
papers concerning trust on the web.  These may be broken 
down into what makes users trust a website, the role of 
trust in customer loyalty, and how to address the issues of 
trust across cultural boundaries, which the reality of a 
“world wide” web necessitates.  
Attempts to establish trust with the user the first time they 
visit a website are usually targeted at a range of triggers 
upon which users have been “trained” to base their 
decision to proceed.  These triggers include listing 
measures taken to ensure data is transferred, processed 
and stored securely, and displaying seals of independent 
trusted third party auditors (Egger, 2001).    
HTTPS and Extended Validation Certificates 
Most people have used websites with an address starting 
with “HTTPS”, which should mean that a secure 
connection has occurred between the web browser and 
the web site being viewed, accomplishing the security 
goal of confidentiality.  Designers should be aware that 
not just the currently viewed page, but also the page 
targeted by the form on the currently viewed page, need 
to use HTTPS for the data to be transferred privately.  
This means that simply looking for HTTPS on the current 
page is not sufficient. 
Note that there is nothing in HTTPS which states who the 
other party is. All the user can be assured of is that they 
are securely connected to someone, and unfortunately that 
someone may not be the entity that the user hoped they 
would be connected to (Ellison 2007).  To help combat 
this, to gain some measure of authentication, Extended 
Validation Certificates have been introduced.   
The process of acquiring an extended validation 
certificate enforces that the holder of a certificate, 
required for HTTPS communication, is who they claim to 
be (http://www.cabforum.org/).  This allows web 
browsers to display the name of the company who owns 
the website, in addition to the company’s web address. 
METHODOLOGY 
Twelve participants were recruited to log their security 
decisions for a week.  All participants were tertiary 
qualified.  Six of the participants recruited were 
researchers in the area of computer security, and six were 
not.  Of the security researchers, 33% were female and 
66% were male; whereas the participants who were not 
security researchers were 66% female and 33% male.   
Every attempt was made to leave the participants in their 
natural setting, and to allow the participants to continue to 
utilise the web as they would normally.  Potential 
participants were asked, via group email and in person, to 
keep a one week log of their security decisions made 
while using the web.  A template for the log file was 
provided to each participant.  The template, a Microsoft 
Word document, consisted of a table with three columns.  
The columns were titled: “Screen image (of the web 
page)”; “Thoughts about the security decision”; and 
“Your security decision”. 
In the template, above the table, were detailed 
instructions concerning how to take a screen image for 
Microsoft Windows and for Mac OS users, and how to 
insert the image into the document.   
Also in the instructions were words describing what the 
second and third column should contain.  Specifically, the 
column titled “Thoughts about the security decision” was 
to contain what information was available to the 
participant, and what extra information they felt they 
needed to make an informed decision.  Finally, the third 
column contained the decision the user made. 
This methodology provided us with rich information, 
typically 3-7 security decision entries per participant, 
about how each individual uses the web in their normal 
environment.  We then analysed the collected data, 
drawing common themes from the responses. 
FINDINGS 
A number of themes could be found in the responses 
provided by the participants. Quotes in the findings below 
are as written by participants. As English is a second 
language for some participants, the authors’ interpretation 
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is added (in brackets) for clarification. 
1. Prior use as a security indictor: A very common 
theme was that participants based their security decision 
on having used the website in question previously.  As 
one participant stated “This is one of the websites I 
frequently visit.  I have been using this for many years.  I 
did not have any problem with this”.  Similarly, “I 
unblocked this pop-up many times before without any 
consequences”.  Knowledge from previous use even 
allowed users to overlook specific security warnings: 
“…Firefox browser warned me about un-trusted 
connection; however, I know the website and I can trust 
it.”  Lack of previous use was a reason for caution, and in 
some cases avoidance: “I do not proceed to the website 
because I do not know about this website and I found it 
using Google Search” (having clicked the link and 
received a security warning).   
2 Checking for security indicators: When deciding if a 
website was secure, the most common method was to 
check that the web address started with “HTTPS” and that 
there was a padlock present.  Participants noted “The web 
page address contains the HTTPS and the lock sign”.  
Further, participants stated “not HTTPS” for websites 
lacking this attribute. 
3. Lack of knowledge of security indicators: Further to 
Finding 2, not one participant mentioned even one point, 
be it name of organisation or colour coding (depending on 
browser), regarding extended validation certificates.  
4. Perception of reputation as a security indicator: 
Perceptions of security, and security choices made, were 
strongly based on the company’s reputation.  Some 
participants stated the only information that they based 
their decision of whether or not to proceed on, was their 
trust in the company that they thought they were dealing 
with.  A typical quote was, “Believe in <name withheld 
for review> reputation, thus believe (in) online security”. 
5: Opaque website designs: Participants found various 
websites where they could not tell if the website was 
secure, even when explicitly looking for security 
indications.  Websites, for example some banks, used 
techniques that embed webpages inside other webpages 
(e.g. using iframes).  This ensures that even people very 
knowledgeable about computers and how HTTPS works, 
could not be sure if their communication was secure.  
Some participants went to the extent of viewing the 
source code for the page to see if the embedded form was 
secure. Others simply felt they had no knowledge or basis 
to judge as they did not know what could be falsified 
easily and what could not.  
6: Unrecognisable website addresses: Participants 
found that they had no way of deciding if a website was 
who they claimed to be, when the website used their IP 
address (eg a number such as 66.102.11.104 as the web 
address, instead of www.google.com as the web address). 
7: Mixed secure and insecure items on a web page: 
Participants noted that security warnings such as “You 
have requested an encrypted page that contains some 
unencrypted information” (very common) had little point.  
Further, they stated that what was secure and what was 
not secure was in no way defined and hence could not be 
used to make a decision.  A response to this was “I 
thought (that it is) worthless to make HTTPS page if such 
a security warning appears as now I more conscious about 
sharing my personal information”.  More significantly, 
some pages were found to be HTTPS pages with forms 
on them, but the forms targeted http webpages. 
8. Unintelligible security warnings:  In many cases, 
security warnings were unintelligible or were 
misinterpreted by lay users. 
DISCUSSION 
A key part of this research was gaining from the 
participants what they regarded as a security decision.  
The method of acquiring the information, a diary rather 
than a questionnaire, meant that one person’s 
interpretation of what “security” meant, and therefore 
what a “security decision” was, could be quite different 
from the next person’s security definition and security 
decisions.  For example, four of the participants logged 
only decisions related to money, and all but one 
participant had security decisions related to accessing and 
paying money.   
One of the most consistent themes throughout the 
participants’ responses was that past usage of websites is 
a key input to decision making (Finding 1).  Previous use, 
and lack of immediately perceived issues, became a form 
of validation that the website was secure, and that 
communicating with the website was secure.   This is not 
a strong foundation to build a security decision on, for 
two main reasons.  Firstly, there is a lack of awareness of 
the changing list of computers on the path between the 
user and the target website. If an eavesdropping attack 
occurs, it is likely to come from a computer on the ever 
changing path. Also, just because a web site was OK 
yesterday does not mean it will not have been hacked into 
overnight without any visible difference to the site itself.  
Secondly, particularly on social networking sites, having 
provided personal information over unsecured channels in 
the past without immediate ramification does not mean 
that it is a safe practice. It is possible for a third party 
attacker to collect such personal information in order to 
mount an attack sometime in the future.  
The only actual security indicator used when making a 
security decision was that users looked for “HTTPS” and 
a padlock symbol when connecting to a website on which 
they would like their information and communication 
protected (Finding 3).  This shows that users have been 
educated to this practice, probably due to the long period 
in which HTTPS has existed (since 1994) (Walls, 2006). 
However, there appears to be little or no education about 
what HTTPS actually does for the user.  Most participants 
indicated that they regarded HTTPS as a “silver bullet”, 
that the presence of HTTPS meant that the site could be 
trusted and was secure.  To talk in terms of the security 
goals defined in the earlier Background section, the only 
security goals that HTTPS provides are confidentiality 
and integrity.  There is no authentication, i.e. the other 
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party may not be who they claim to be. 
Finding 3 highlights that not one participant mentioned 
looking for extended validation certificate information in 
making their security decisions while using the web.  This 
emphasises that while the public are aware of HTTPS, 
education is lacking concerning extended certificates, and 
that there is an opportunity to improve interaction design 
of warnings and certificates.  
The most significant observation that can be made when 
reading design papers on trust is that most, if not all, of 
the suggestions and observations on how to get a user to 
trust a website are based on ideas other than any of the 
reasons a user should trust a website.  For example, 
providing items such as “company details” and 
“prominent links to the privacy policy” (Egger, 2001) are 
listed as guidance on how to get a user to trust a website 
(Koehn, 2003). However these items are easily utilised 
and copied by adversaries. Since such guidance is not 
based on any underlying security protocol, it could read 
as a “how to design a fraudulent website” guide.   
Findings 5, 6, 7 and 8 all relate to design choices, which 
impact the user’s ability to make good security decisions.  
CONCLUSION 
The findings of the research showed that, based on self-
reported security decisions made in their own context of 
use, by far the biggest, and in some cases “only”, item of 
tangible security that users based their security decisions 
on, was whether or not the website’s address was HTTPS, 
and whether there was a padlock symbol in the web 
browser.  Conversely, the research showed that the 
concepts of extended validation certificates have not 
permeated into the general public. 
After this, the main factor that participants based their 
security decision on was the reputation of the company 
whose website they thought they were browsing.  While 
company reputation is an important factor, security 
decisions should not be based upon reputation prior to 
authenticating that company is who they claim to be.  
Further, when private transactions are being made with 
the company, the channel of communication should have 
the confidentiality property (ie HTTPS).  
Designers need to be aware of the security goals, and 
design their browsers and websites with these security 
goals in mind.  Designs should highlight, rather than hide, 
the key information that users need to make informed 
security decisions.   This will involve the designers either 
acquiring the knowledge of security fundamentals 
themselves, or liaising with security professionals.   
Extended validation certificates remain the best way to 
authenticate to the user that they are dealing with a 
specific company, and communicating with them 
securely.  Web browsers need to be adapted to more 
clearly indicate, and educate, users on the significance of 
the extended validation certificate information. 
Finally, the method used of participants keeping a diary 
of their security decisions for a week, yielded very rich 
results about self reported security decisions made in the 
participants context of use.  Commonality across all 
participants was found regarding firstly, looking for 
HTTPS, secondly, that not one participant listed any 
extended validation certificate information in their 
decision process, and finally, how the company’s 
reputation was a significant factor for many.  That said, 
each participant was different and this yielded other very 
useful information, such as that using IP addresses, 
iframes, or mixed secure and non-secure content, 
obstructed the security decision making process. 
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